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"uninvited ear," not the "intruding eye."' 49 He wished to keep what
he said private, and was justified in assuming that this would be the
case.5 Therefore, he was entitled to the protection afforded by the
fourth amendment-freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures."
A question left open in this case, and one which may prove to be
important later, is raised in the Court's footnote 23. In this footnote
the Court observed that the present decision was not concerned with
eavesdropping in cases involving national security. In a concurring
opinion,5 2 Justice White expressed the view that the warrant
procedure should be dispensed with in cases of national security if
eavesdropping is authorized by the President or Attorney General,
stating for his only reason that successive presidents have
authorized such surveillance to protect the security of the nation.53
In rebuttal to this, Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion," in
which he was joined by Justice Brennan, raised the point that the
President and Attorney General, because of their positions, are
not detached from the problem of national security, and thus do not
qualify as neutral magistrates. The fourth amendment draws no
distinction between substantive offenses, and, therefore, none
should be drawn here.55 The point is well taken, and the argument
convincing, and may prove to be the better view. At a time when
international espionage is an acute problem, the question left open
by the Katz case may call for an early answer.
John Charles Lobert

Constitutional Law-Group Legal ServicesUnauthorized Practice of Law
The Illinois State Bar Association sought to have a labor union
enjoin from the practice of employing licensed attorneys on a
salary basis to prosecute workmen's compensation claims for any
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
50 Id. at 352.
49

51 Id. at 359.

Id. at 362
Id. at 364
14 Id. at 359
55 Id. at 360
52

53

(concurring
(concurring
(concurring
(concurring

opinion).
opinion).
opinion).
opinion).
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union member who desired their services. The Bar Association
asserted that this practice constituted an unauthorized practice of law.
The trial court granted the injunction and the Illinois supreme
court affirmed. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of
the United States. Held, judgment vacated. The union's practice
was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. Dist. 12,
UMW v. Illinois Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).

The situation presented in this case is a conflict between two
important rights-the right of union members to have an adequate
means of securing the compensation to which they are legally
entitled and the right of a state to regulate the professional standards
of the legal profession in order to maintain a high level of ethical
conduct. An attempt must be made to balance these interests to
adequately protect both rights while also protecting the interest of
the general public. This is not easily accomplished and differences as
to how best to achieve this balancing objective have arisen in most
cases where these interests have clashed.
Union attempts to provide legal assistance for members is not
a recent development. Union organization of legal aid departments
arose shortly after the enactment of state or federal legislation which
provided means for workers injured on their jobs to obtain
compensation for the injuries. The need for some such assistance
arose from the fact that workers were being victimized by
unscrupulous claim adjusters or incompetent attorneys.' The
activities of the legal aid departments did not long go unchallenged
and were usually attacked as violating legal ethics and constituting
the unlawful practice of law by a lay organization. An example
of a legal aid department is that which was organized by the
Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen to aid its members in the
collection of F.E.L.A. claims against railroad companies. The
department investigated claims and recommended employment of its
regional counsel by the injured member or his surviving family.
The lawyer who handled the case charged a fixed contingency fee
and paid all costs and expenses including the cost of running the
department. 2 This system was attacked in the courts on several bases.
The lawyers involved were held to be guilty of unprofessional conduct
I Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 33 (1964).
2 In re Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 13 ll.2d 391, 393, 150 N.E.2d 163, 165

(1958).
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and violation of the code of ethics;3 the system was enjoined; 4
the union fact finding member was enjoined from carrying out his
activities;' and financial connection between the union and the
lawyers was held to be unacceptable. 6 In one case the system
was disapproved, but the trial court's decision to allow the lawyer
involved to prosecute the case was upheld
In Hildebrand v.
State Bar of California,' the system was held improper but the lawyers
involved were not punished because there was no prior decision
holding the activities to be improper.
There was one exception to the holdings that the system was
illegal. The court in Ryan v. Pennsylvania Railroad," where a

lawyer sought collection of his fee, upheld the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen's system of providing legal aid to its members.
The court in a strongly worded opinion declared, "[W]e feel
impelled to say that the assertion that the Brotherhood, through its
legal aid department, is akin to an ambulancer and that the petitioner
was a beneficiary of an unethical and unlawful system of obtaining
clients, is unworthy of the able lawyers who made it."'" There were
two strong dissents in the Hildebrand case which also found nothing
illegal in the Brotherhood's practice. It was asserted that similar plans
were allowed in connection with insurance companies, legal aid
bureaus, and merchants' associations." The object of the plan is
primarilyto aid members in obtaining competent legal advice at rates
which they can afford and not to bring business to the attorneys or
stir up litigation.' 2 The compensation law is useless unless the
members are able to use it." Finally, the plan has none of the evils
that the rules against solicitation by a group are designed to prevent."
The lower court cases in this area showed some disagreement, but
mostly held the union legal aid plans to be in violation of the code
3 In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. N.Y. 1933); In re Comm. of
Cleveland Bar Ass'n' 15 Ohio L. Abs. 106 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933).
4 Hulse v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 340 S.W.2d 404 (Mo. 1960); State

ex rel. Beck v. Lush, 170 Neb. 376, 103 N.W.2d 136 (1960).

Doughty v. Gills, 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (1952).
6 In re Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Il1.2d 391, 398, 150 N.E.2d 163, 167
(1958).
7 Atchison, T. & S. Fe Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 9516).
8 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
9 268 IIl. App. 364 (1932).
10 Id. at 373.
" Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 516, 225

P.2d 508, 515 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
12 Id. at 517, 225 P.2d at 516.
13 Id. at 520, 225 P.2d at 518.
14 Id. at 527, 225 P.2d at 522.
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of legal ethics. The more recent cases decided in the Supreme Court,
however, have upheld the legal aid plans of associations. The first
of these cases was NAACP v. Button'" decided in 1963. The
NAACP had sued to enjoin the enforcement of Virginia's antisolicitation statute. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held
that NAACP activities violated the statute. The NAACP encouraged the voluntary instigation of civil rights litigation, paid
all litigation expenses, and provided a staff lawyer who was an expert
in the field to handle the litigation. The lawyer was paid a per diem
fee only for his services and controlled the conduct of the litigation."
The Supreme Court held that these activities were forms of
association and expression protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments and could not be prohibited as improper solicitation of
legal business.'" The first amendment not only protects abstract
discussion but also vigorous advocacy of lawful ends. As used by the
NAACP, litigation is a means of achieving equal treatment and
is a form of political expression. 8 The statute was found faulty
because of vagueness which may lead to selective enforcement.' 9 The
Court also found that the elements of malicious intent and pecuniary
gain, evils sought to be controlled by anti-solicitation statutes, were
not present in this case.2" The state had shown no substantial
regulatory interest to justify the broad prohibitions imposed.'
Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion, expressed the view that a
reasonable state regulation regulating conduct associated with speech
should be upheld. 2 He felt that the statute sought to protect the
personal relationship between lawyer and client and prevent a
divided allegiance of the lawyer between the association and the
individual litigant.23
The protection of associational legal aid was extended the next year
in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia.24 The
Brotherhood maintained a Department of Legal Counsel which
recommended to members the names of lawyers to prosecute their
injury claims. This resulted in the channeling of most claims to
1! 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
16 Id. at 420.
17 Id. at 428.
18 Id. at 429.
19 Id. at 435.
20 Id. at 439.
21 Id. at 444.
22 Id. at 454 (dissenting opinion).
23 Id. at 460 (dissenting opinion).
24 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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certain designated lawyers.25 The Court held that this plan was
protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. The union
members had the right to consult with each other including the
right to select a spokesman who gives the wisest counsel. This right
encompassed the legal aid plan. The members were not engaging in
the practice of law, nor were they soliciting business for the lawyers.
The plan was no threat to legal ethics which the state might
reasonably control.26 Justice Clark in a strongly worded dissent
reasoned that the decision lowered the level of the practice of law
to that of a commercial enterprise and degraded the profession."'
Special attorneys were not needed by union members to represent
them. " The potential evil of the system is enormous and the system
works to the disadvantage of the individual union member. Finally,
the decision would encourage other further departures from high
ethical standards.29
0
Dist. 12, UMW v. Illinois State Bar Association"
is the most

recent of these Supreme Court cases. The union employed an attorney
on a salary, which was his only compensation, to represent union
members in their claims under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act. The union provided forms to its members to apply for legal
aid, but they were free to employ other counsel. The attorney's only
obligation was to be to his client, but he usually would have personal
contact with the client only if no settlement could be made. The
full amount of the award would go to the client. 1 The Court
once again held that the first and fourteenth amendments protected
the plan. Laws which affect first amendment rights "cannot be
sustained merely because they were enacted for the purpose of dealing
with some evil within the state's legislative competence, or even
because the laws do in fact provide a helpful means of dealing with
such an evil." 2
In a dissenting opinion Justice Harlan suggested ways the union
could achieve its goals within acceptable ethical conduct. These
were to tell the members names of capable attorneys to assure
they would have access to competent legal counsel, to reimburse
members for expenses to protect them from crippling legal costs, and
25
26
27
28
29

30
31
22

Id. at 2.
Id. at 6.

Id. at 9 (dissenting opinion).

Id.

Id. at 12 (dissenting opinion).
389 U.S. 217 (1967).

Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
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to rely on enforcement of the Illinois Compensation Act to protect
against excessive legal fees. 33 His objections to the plan were that the
lawyer may have little contact with his client, may want a quick
settlement, may compromise for reasons not connected with the
individual case, and may not appeal cases which should be appealed. 4
Justice Harlan concluded by insisting that the fact that no proven
harm existed did not mean that the state could not attempt to prevent
possible harm."
The three Supreme Court cases indicate an increasing tendency
to balance the two competing interests involved in favor of group
members in securing their legal rights over the interest of the
state in maintaining high standards of ethics in the legal profession.
Whether this will result in dire consequences such as those suggested
by Justice Clark in his dissent in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen

v. Virginiais yet to be determined. Much varied comment concerning
group legal aid is available. 6 Whether the permissive attitude taken
toward union legal aid plans will be extended to other groups must
await tomorrow's judgments. In the past, group legal services
offered by auto clubs,'" taxpayer associations," and credit groups' 9
have been held to be the unlawful practice of law. Protection of
individual rights, however meritorious, must not be at the expense
of debasing ethical standards of the profession.
In the administration of justice, a proper and practical balance
is to be maintained between these merging interests. Principles and
arguments involved are to be carefully weighed in the interest of the
public good. This objective cannot be accomplished simply by claims
of undermining essential professional standards and charges of self
interest.4"
3

Id. at 228 (dissenting opinion).

Id. at 232 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 233 (dissenting opinion).
36 See Symposium, Group Legal Services in Perspective, 12 U.C.L.A.
Law Rev. 279 (1964); Hourigan, Group Legal Services-An Old Wine in a
New Bottle, 39 PENN. BAR ASS'N QuAR. 18 (1967).
'7 In re Maclub of Am., Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936);
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv. Ass'n 55 R.I 122, 179 A. 139
(1935);
50, 199 N.E. 1
(1935a). Chicago Bar Assn v. Chicago Motor Clu, 362 I11.
'4
'5

38 People ex rel. Courtney v. Ass'n of Real Estate Tax-payers, 354 I1.
102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933).
39 Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n of Richmond, 167 Va.
327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937).
40One commentator has observed concerning group legal services "The
real argument against their approval by the bar is believed to be foss of
income to the lawyers and concentration of service in the bands of fewer
lawyers." H. DnnqrER, LEGAL ETics 167 (1953).
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Some modification of the code of legal ethics may be necessary
to resolve this conflict of interests. 4 ' As Justice Traynor well noted,
"Given the primary duty of the legal profession to serve the public,
the rules it establishes to govern its professional ethics must be
directed at the performance of that duty."42
John Reed Homburg

Criminal Law-Misdemeanors--Indigent's
Right to Appointed Counsel
D was charged with committing a misdemeanor. At the time of
his arraignment he alleged he was financially unable to procure
counsel. The court informed him that no counsel could be appointed
and set the date for his trial. At the trial D offered no testimony,
exhibits, or statements, and did not conduct cross-examination. He
was found guilty and sentenced to a fine or imprisonment in default
of payment. He paid the fine under protest and appealed. On appeal
he was again denied appointed counsel. D then applied to the state
supreme court for an alternative writ of mandamus. Held, writ issued
and cause remanded to determine indigency. A defendant unable
to procure counsel when he is charged with a misdemeanor punishable
by incarceration is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent
him. State v. Borst, 154 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1967).
The case raises the controversial question of the right of an indigent
misdemeanant to have counsel appointed in his behalf in a state
proceeding. The basis of such a right must come from the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution which in part provides,
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to...
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."' This provision governs
federal criminal proceedings and has been interpreted to mean that
if the defendant cannot afford to retain counsel, such counsel must
4' For several months the American Bar Association has been giving
consideration to a general revision of the statement of the standards of the
legal profession, particularly through its Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards. See Comment, 53 A.B.AJ. 901 (1967).
42 Hildebrand v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 522, 225
P.2d 508, 519 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
' U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968

7

